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(54) **SUBSYSTEM AUTHENTICITY AND INTEGRITY VERIFICATION (SAIV)**

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**G06F 21/00** (2013.01)  
**G06F 21/81** (2013.01)  
**G06F 21/86** (2013.01)

(52) **U.S. Cl.**  
CPC ..... **G06F 21/81** (2013.01); **G06F 21/86** (2013.01)  
USPC ..... **713/168**; **726/36**

(58) **Field of Classification Search**  
None  
See application file for complete search history.

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(57) **ABSTRACT**

Systems and methods are disclosed for enhancing anti-terrorism public safety measures, by more securely determining whether explosives or other contraband have been inserted into notebook computer batteries or other large, replaceable subsystems of electronic devices. Because notebook computers typically require large, heavy batteries, they present attractive containers for smugglers and terrorists attempting to bring explosives onto an airplane. The disclosed security testing system provides more reliable results than many current tests, and does not require that the device under test be powered on. The systems and methods disclosed use out-of-band authentication for added security.

**6 Claims, 6 Drawing Sheets**




FIG. 1




FIG. 2




FIG. 3  
(Prior Art)




FIG. 4




FIG. 5





FIG. 6



1

**SUBSYSTEM AUTHENTICITY AND INTEGRITY VERIFICATION (SAIV)****CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS**

This is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/754,592, filed Apr. 5, 2010, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,347,092, and claims priority thereto.

**TECHNICAL FIELD**

The invention relates generally to anti-terrorism public safety measures. More particularly, and not by way of any limitation, the application relates to detecting the tampering of battery-operated electronic devices in order to conceal explosives or other contraband.

**BACKGROUND**

Because notebook computers typically require large, heavy batteries, they present attractive containers for smugglers and terrorists attempting to bring contraband or explosives onto an airplane. Current security measures appear to reflect the awareness of this situation, because security personnel at airport security screening checkpoints often ask travelers to power on notebook computers. The theory behind this test is that, if the computer did not power up, the security officer would then suspect that the computer battery may have been removed and replaced with an explosive device or contraband. Additionally, given the fire and explosive hazards of lithium batteries in general the Transportation and Security Administration has recently issued new restrictions on the amount (specified in units of grams) of lithium that can be contained in specific batteries and still be transported on commercial aircraft.

Unfortunately, a simple power-on test, which lasts for a matter of mere seconds, is unable to indicate whether the entire battery has been replaced with a combination of a reduced-capacity battery and prohibited material. In order to spoof this overly-simplistic test, a smuggler can place a smaller capacity battery within the primary battery housing, along with the smuggled material. Likewise, in the case of counterfeit batteries, the screening procedures can only rely on the appearance of the battery package and the correctness of the associated labeling. Thus, the current tests fail to provide a meaningful level of security.

The enduring risk faced by millions of air travelers is evidence of a failure of others to supply a meaningful, effective, and yet conveniently rapid security test for electrical devices that are routinely carried onto airplanes and other attractive targets of terrorism.

**BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS**

For a more complete understanding of the present invention, reference is now made to the following descriptions taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings:

FIG. 1 illustrates an embodiment of a subsystem authenticity and integrity verification (SAIV) security testing system.

FIG. 2 illustrates an embodiment of a notebook computer that is prepared for security screening with a SAIV system.

FIG. 3 illustrates a prior art notebook computer, having a component authenticity verification system.

FIG. 4 illustrates a tampered notebook computer.

2

FIG. 5 illustrates a method of performing authenticity and integrity verification.

FIG. 6 illustrates another method of performing authenticity and integrity verification.

**DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION**

To better highlight the advantages of the invention, a prior art authenticity verification system and its shortcomings will be described first.

FIG. 3 illustrates a prior art notebook computer 300, comprising main housing 301 having a battery compartment 302. Main housing 301 could be the base portion of a notebook computer, because notebook computers typically house the largest battery within the base, rather than the lid. Prior art battery 314 is sized and shaped to fit at least partially within compartment 302, and contains power supply material 303, which may comprise a dielectric gel and sheets of conductive material. In some embodiments, battery 314 could be another form of power supply such as a super-capacitor, because although super-capacitors operate on different principles than conventional rechargeable batteries, they often provide similar functionality as a portable power source. Battery 314 may fit entirely inside compartment 302, and then be enclosed with a door or panel, or else a portion of battery 314 may form part of an exterior portion of housing 301 so that when battery 314 is removed from housing 301, compartment 302 becomes an open cavity. Other attachment configurations could also be used.

Battery 314 also comprises a connector 304, through which power supply current flows in order to provide electrical power to components within housing 301 and also any other portions of notebook computer 300, such as a lid containing a display. Other signals may also flow through connector 304. A connector 305, disposed in housing 301, possibly partially within compartment 302 as illustrated, mates with connector 304 to bring in power supply current and other signals from battery 314, and also to send charging current, as well as other signals, to battery 314.

Battery 314 further comprises an Anti-Counterfeit Token (ACT) 306, which is accessed by Anti-Counterfeit Challenge (ACC) logic 307, illustrated as located within housing 301. The purpose of ACT 306 is to ensure that only batteries approved by a manufacturer of notebook computer 300 are used with housing 301. There are multiple reasons for this, which include product liability risk mitigation and revenue enhancement.

Batteries for notebook computers have a reputation for overheating and causing fires, and so must be carefully constructed in order to minimize risks. However, because rechargeable batteries often wear out while a computer still has otherwise useful life, they are commonly replaced by the owner. If an owner of a notebook computer uses a poor quality counterfeit replacement battery, which had been manufactured by a third party, and the counterfeit battery starts a fire in a notoriously litigious jurisdiction, the owner will be likely be inundated by promises of a large sum of money by contingency fee products liability lawyers who are searching for an excuse to file a lawsuit against the manufacturer, thereby incentivizing poor decisions and driving up costs of notebook computers for other consumers.

To minimize the risk of this scenario occurring, many computer manufacturers include authenticity verification systems in their devices that have replaceable parts, such as batteries, in order to prevent the use of replacement parts that had been supplied by unauthorized third parties. Additionally, this well-known liability mitigation strategy provides the



manufacturer with an opportunity to generate an enhanced revenue stream, because the user is locked-in to purchasing replacement batteries only from the manufacturer, for the entire life of the computer. The replacement batteries can then be priced so high that the computer user will only just barely choose to replace the battery, rather than purchasing an entirely new notebook computer from a competitor of the manufacturer.

The illustrated ACT 306 and ACC logic 307 operate in this manner: ACC logic 307 sends a challenge to ACT 306. If ACT 306 responds correctly, then ACC logic 307 operates as if battery 314 is a legitimate, manufacturer-approved subsystem. If ACT 306 does not respond correctly, ACC logic 307 determines that battery 314 is counterfeit, and notifies Counterfeit Detection Response (CDR) logic 308, that is within or coupled to processor(s) and memory 309. CDR logic 308 then issues some alert to the user, or perhaps impairs operation of notebook computer 300. Together, ACT 306, ACC logic 307, and CDR logic 308 form an authenticity verification system for notebook computer 300.

Unfortunately, this system has a fundamental weakness: The shared secret, which enables ACC logic 307 to recognize ACT 306 as legitimate, is contained entirely within the environment that is under the control of whoever possesses notebook computer 300. Anyone who wishes to tamper with notebook computer 300 can intercept and monitor signals passing through connectors 304 and 305 when both legitimate and counterfeit batteries are used. Using the monitored signals, the secrets contained in ACT 304 can be reverse-engineered and forged, or otherwise spoofed. Alternatively, one or more of ACC logic 307 and CDR logic 308 can be disabled. One of more of these attacks can be accomplished by someone with sufficient motivation, and the manufacturer of notebook computer 300 must rely on the effort needed for these attacks to simply be too much of an inconvenience for the majority of consumers to justify saving some money on a battery replacement.

However, terrorists, who intend to bring down an airplane and kill hundreds of people, may spend years preparing for the operation, and also may be well-funded. Additionally, some smugglers of expensive contraband may find the inconvenience of the attacks to be an acceptable cost. Thus, the prior art authenticity verification system of notebook computer 300 is unsuitable for reliable security and anti-smugglings efforts, and is subject to compromise as is illustrated in FIG. 4.

FIG. 4 illustrates a tampered notebook computer 400. In FIG. 4, housing 401 has been prepared to accept battery bomb 414 into battery compartment 302. Battery bomb 414 contains explosive material 415, although drugs or other contraband could also be hidden inside a battery casing. In the process of prying open the casing of battery bomb 414, ACT 406 had been damaged. Although a prior art authenticity verification system would be poised to catch this damage—the authenticity verification system in tampered notebook computer 400 has been rendered ineffective.

The bomber or smuggler has anticipated a demand for a power-on test at a security checkpoint, and so has tampered with ACC logic 407 to blind it to an incorrect response from damaged ACT 406. Alternatively CDR logic 408, located within or coupled to processor(s) and memory 409, could have been tampered to ignore an alert from ACC logic 407. Possibly, because the smuggler recorded traffic between connectors 305 and 306, prior to damaging ACT 406 by tampering, ACT 406 could have been repaired, or a forged system that mimics the behavior of undamaged ACT 206 could be placed within battery bomb 414. Combinations of these three

attacks could be used to enhance the reliability of the intended deception. In any case, the authenticity verification system in notebook computer 400 will fail to alert a security screener to the tampering of battery bomb 414.

The bomber or smuggler then addresses the need of passing an anticipated power-up test as a security checkpoint. The test will have only a very short duration, because the security line will be long, and security screeners generally only have a short amount of time to spend with each person. So only enough power capacity is required within battery bomb 414 to enable a few boot-up sequences and possibly power a detonator receiver. Because the original battery contained enough power supply material to power a notebook computer for several hours, and because the amount of decoy power supply material 403 only needs to provide operation for a small fraction of this time, decoy power supply material 403 will only need to occupy only a small percentage of the volume of the housing of battery bomb 414. The majority of the volume of the housing of battery bomb 414 is thus available to use for housing explosive material 415. If battery bomb 414 had used the case of an extended life battery, the amount of explosive material 415 that could be fit within the housing could be significant.

Although saving money on battery replacements may not provide sufficient motivation for such tampering, as described for FIG. 4, more sinister opportunities can provide sufficient motivation. Hijacking a cruise ship, or destroying a flying airplane that is full of passengers, is likely to easily motivate kidnappers and terrorists to bypass prior art authenticity verification systems, such as the system illustrated in FIG. 3.

One example of a successful tampering scenario would be that hijackers intend to smuggle several bomb-laden notebook computers onto a cruise ship and hide them in a plurality of critical locations. Then, after detonating one of the computer bombs while the ship was at sea, the hijackers could demand control of the entire ship, using the threat of detonating additional bombs to coerce the crew and passengers to cooperate and refrain from escaping or searching for the remaining bombs.

What about reliance upon x-ray machines and chemical sensors for security? These security tests are similarly vulnerable to defeat by a properly-motivated person. Because virtually anyone with sufficient resources can see how power supply material 303 appears to an operator of an x-ray machine, explosive material 415 can be disguised to have a similar appearance. Also, because battery bomb 414 can be sealed to be both watertight and airtight, it can be chemically washed after explosive material 415 is inserted, to be sufficiently clean that commonly-used chemical sensors at security checkpoints will fail to identify any chemical signatures of explosives residue. Therefore, because Applicants (and presumably the patent Examiner, as well) wish to avoid being killed by terrorists, a more secure system is needed.

Turning now to FIG. 1, an embodiment of an improved security system is illustrated: a subsystem authenticity and integrity verification (SAIV™) security testing system 100. A SAIV security station 101 is coupled to a SAW-compliant notebook computer 102, through a SAIV security port 103. Port 103 can be configured to have an existing form factor, such as a USB or Ethernet connector, or can have a unique form factor that is not compatible with other common connectors and includes its own ACT circuitry. The reduced availability of a connector, for example through tightly-controlled manufacturing and the use of ACT circuitry integrated into the connector, along with a tamper-evident design, can offer some improvements in security by raising the cost of

successful tampering. However, a sufficiently-funded person could still forge even an ostensibly secure connector.

SAIV-compliant notebook computer **102** is described in more detail in FIG. 2, and some representative methods of operating security testing system **100** are described in FIGS. **5** and **6**. However, returning to FIG. **1**, it can be seen that SAIV security station **101** is coupled to a plurality of remote secret stores, illustrated as remote secret stores **104-105**, through a computer network **107**, which may be the internet or a dedicated network. Although three remote secret stores are illustrated, it should be understood that a different number can be used. As will be described shortly, there is an increasing advantage in using a larger number of separate remote secret stores.

As illustrated, remote secret store **104** contains secret S1', remote secret store **105** contains secret S2', and remote secret store **106** contains secret S3'. These secrets S1'-S3' were generated at a secret source facility **108**, which correspond with a respective one of secrets S1-S3 that are in battery **109**. Secret source facility **108** could be a government-run facility for providing S1-S3 to a government-approved battery manufacturer, or alternatively, could be part of battery manufacturing facility **110** and be operated by the manufacturer itself to distribute battery **109** and secrets S1' and S3'. In either case, security will be enhanced of each of remote secret stores **104-105** has access to only its assigned secret, selected from S1'-S3', but not the other secrets. For example, remote secret store **104** will not have access to either secret S2' or S3', nor will security station **101** have access to any of S1'-S3'. Thus, even if remote secret store **104** is compromised by hackers, secrets S2' and S3' can remain uncompromised. Additionally, no secrets will be compromised, even if security station **101** is stolen or compromised by hackers. Each of S1'-S3' is unique to battery **109**, so that other batteries made at battery manufacturer facility **110** will have a different set of secrets, and therefore each of remote secret stores **104-105** will have a database covering many different batteries.

Authenticity verification using shared secrets is well known in the art. For some systems S1=S1', S2=S2', and S3=S3', although for other systems S1-S3 are uniquely paired with a respective one of S1'-S3', but contain different information. One example for Sn=Sn' would be this: Security station **101** generates a data stream by selecting a random number and combining it with a time stamp and a security token ID code key **111** that uniquely identifies security station **101** relative to other SAIV security stations. Security station **101** checks port **103** for integrity, issues an alert if port **103** fails, but if port **103** passes, security station then sends the generated data stream through port **103**, requesting use of S2. A SAIV security token module within a replaceable subsystem of notebook computer **102**, for example battery **109**, encrypts the data stream with S2 as the key in a symmetric encryption operation. Security station **101** retrieves the result from notebook computer **102**, along with an ID code for the subsystem, and forwards this new data stream through computer network **107** to remote secret store **105**. At remote secret store **105**, S2' (which should be equal to S2 in this example) is identified in the database, indexed by the ID code for the subsystem within notebook computer **102**. Remote secret store **105** returns the decryption result, which will only be correct for a symmetric encryption operation if S2' actually does equal S2. Upon comparing the result returned from remote secret store **105**, and noting equality, security station **101** has verified the correctness of S2 within battery **109**. This also verifies the integrity and authenticity of battery **109**, if battery **109** had been constructed such that any tampering would destroy S2 information.

Alternatively, security station **101** could first retrieve the ID code for the subsystem, send a generated data stream to a selected one of remote secret stores **104-105** for encryption, possibly including key **111**, a timestamp, and a random number, and then forwards the returned result through port **103**. The selection of the specific one of remote secret stores **104-106** can be random or deterministic, but should avoid any one of remote secret stores **104-106** that is known to have been compromised. Each secret, S1-S3, within battery **109** could then be used to attempt decrypting the result that had been returned from the selected remote secret store. Security station **101** then checks all decryption results from notebook computer **102**, and only one should have been decrypted properly.

An example of Sn corresponding to Sn', but Sn not equaling Sn', would be if Sn and Sn' comprised a key pair for an asymmetric encryption operation, for example public key encryption. This way, a data stream encrypted with Sn could only decrypt properly with Sn', and a data stream encrypted with Sn' could only decrypt properly with Sn. The use of a timestamp and a random number helps reduce vulnerability to a replay attack. Additionally, if security station **101** keeps track of recently-encountered subsystem ID numbers, and shares such information with other operating security stations, a cloned subsystem can be detected. For example, if security station **101** checked a subsystem with a particular ID, then within some time-out threshold, a similar security station known to be operating a far distance away encountered the same number, or else security station **101** encountered that same ID again itself, security station **101** could generate an alert that the subsystem is likely to have been cloned.

Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) can offer some protection against cloning secrets that are used for authenticity and integrity verification. PUFs are described in patent application publications, WO 2009/024913, US 2009/0083833, and US 2008/0279373, which are incorporated by reference as teachings of the prior art on the use of PUFs in device authentication. Integrity verification can be accomplished by a number of tamper-evidence protections that result in the destruction or loss of information in the event that tampering occurs. These can include the storage of critical information on a medium that rapidly decomposes upon exposure to light or air, so that if battery housing **109** is opened after it had been sealed at battery manufacturing facility **110**, all secrets S1-S3 are immediately and irretrievably lost or altered by the decomposition of material storing the secrets. Other methods include the use of gas pressurization, a pressure sensor, and a reserve battery charge that can be used to melt logic circuitry containing S1-S3. Also small wires can be used that will break upon opening a battery case, thereby providing a logic indication when a voltage signal carried on the wires is lost, and a self-destruct procedure can be triggered by the logic indication. Active sensors, such as vibration, light, and electrical resistance can be used to detect tamper efforts, aimed at retrieving secrets S1-S3 for use in a replay attack. A volatile non-imprinting memory device, embedded within battery **109**, can store secrets S1-S3 and can be powered by the main battery, because it would probably never fully discharge and the number of bits comprising the secrets S1-S3 would not require much power to keep alive. Combinations of these methods, and other methods that are known in the art, can also be used.

Security station **101** is illustrated as comprising processor (s) and memory **112**, which performs computations and executes logic to implement methods described herein, for example by running a computer program that is configured to be executed by one or more processors of processor(s) and memory **112**. A cable **113** is also provided, for coupling

security station **101** to port **103**. Although a wireless coupling could be used, for example a T-coil, a radio frequency (RF) shielded wired connection is generally more secure. This is because a strong RF signal from a more distant source can overpower a weaker RF signal from a closer source, and unless further precautions are taken, this can lead to confusion about which system is undergoing security inspection. Security station **101** can comprise any components that are associated with computers, such as a video display and other storage devices, including firmware, non-volatile memory, optical and magnetic storage mediums, and other computer readable mediums that may store computer programs and data (including key **111** and associated logic), that perform any of the methods described herein.

It should be noted that several concepts are introduced with the disclosed SAIV system. These include that the challenge/response authentication is moved out of band, such that an attacker, who has possession of notebook computer **103** and has even hacked into security station **101**, does not have access to all the information that is necessary to verify authenticity and integrity for a protected subsystem, such as battery **109**. No shared secret is entirely within the control of a person possessing notebook computer **102** or operating security station **101**, because a remote secret store, one of **104-106**, has the other portion of the information.

The use of multiple remote secret stores provides redundancy in the security methods that can be leveraged to preserve trust in a protected subsystem, in the event that one of the secret stores is compromised. Coupling of security station **101** directly to a SAIV token within a subsystem, without going through any logic controlled by notebook computer **102**, reduces the likelihood of secret spoofing. The system will likely be more secure if SAIV port **103** is directly on a tamper-evident enclosure of the protected subsystem, because any signal path within notebook computer **102** provides opportunities for spoofing, hidden from a security screener operating security station **101**.

Turning now to FIG. 2, notebook computer **102** will be described in more detail. Notebook computer **102** comprises main housing **201**, having a battery compartment **202**. Battery **109** is sized and shaped to fit at least partially within compartment **202**, and contains power supply material **203**. Other power supply systems, besides rechargeable batteries that store energy chemically, could also be used, as well as multiple attachment configurations.

Battery **109** also comprises a connector **204**, through which power supply current flows to power components within housing **201**. Other signals may also flow through connector **204** or another, separate connector. A connector **205**, disposed in housing **201**, mates with connector **204** to communicate power supply and charging current and possibly other signals. Battery **109** further comprises an ACT **206**, which is accessed by ACC logic **207** in housing **201**. ACC logic **208** then communicates with CDR **208**, which is within or coupled to processor(s) and memory **209**. Memory in processor(s) and memory **209** comprises a computer readable medium, which may include volatile random access memory (RAM), non-volatile RAM, optical media, magnetic media, and other non-transitory media.

Battery **109** additionally comprises a SAIV token **210**. Token **210** has at least one secret that is not shared with or otherwise determinable from any other part of notebook computer **102**. Thus, information needed to verify the authenticity of token **210** has been moved out of band. As illustrated, token **210** contains three secrets, S1, S2, and S3, although a different number could be used. A plurality of secrets provides back-up trust for token **210**, in the event that one of the secrets

is compromised. Additionally, token **210** comprises an ID code and may also comprise logic and processing capability, for example symmetric or asymmetric encryption, in order to encrypt or decrypt an incoming data stream with one or more of S1-S3. Token **210** can then return the result of this logic operation, along with the ID code, or could return the ID code and logic operation result at separate times. Token can perform these operations without the need to power on notebook computer **102**, thereby saving time at the security screening checkpoint. Processor(s) and memory **209** are not powered-on or put into a boot-up sequence.

As illustrated, token **210** is coupled to SAIV ports **211** and **212**, although only one of the ports may be needed. Either one of ports **211** and **212** can perform the functions described for port **103** in FIG. 1. Port **211** is directly coupled, within the housing of battery **109**, and therefore provides more tamper-evidence than the use of port **212**. However, the use of port **211** makes it desirable that at least a portion of the housing of battery **109** be accessible from outside notebook computer **102**. Being able to rapidly connect security station **101** to a SAIV port on notebook computer **102**, without opening notebook computer **102**, minimizes inspection time at a security screening station. This is desirable, because every second of delay in the screening process can accumulate to make wait times excessive when lines are long at a screening station.

Token **210** is also illustrated as connected to port **212** through connectors **204** and **205**, although it should be understood that other connection configurations can be used. Although this particular configuration can be used if necessary, for example if battery **109** is inaccessible to external cable **113**, any wiring between connector **205** and port **212** provides a connection point for intercepting and spoofing communication between security station **101** and token **210**. As illustrated, port **212** has its own integrated ACT circuitry **213**. Port **211** may also have an integrated ACT circuit.

FIG. 5 illustrates a method **500** of performing authenticity and integrity verification, which may be performed by security station **101**. In box **501**, cable **113** is connected to one of ports **211** and **212**. Security station **101** then checks the authenticity of the port connector, for example by using ACT **213** or an equivalent ACT in port **212**. This checks the port itself for tampering or forgery, which is primarily useful of the prt connectors are controlled-manufacture devices with a unique form factor. If tampering is detected, security station **101** generates an alarm for the security screener, perhaps by sounding an audible alert ad/or displaying a message I a video display. Otherwise, security station **101** begins communicating with token **210**, which is a security token within a removable subsystem of notebook computer **102**, and method **500** proceeds to box **502**. A number N is selected for testing a secret Sn, although in some embodiments of method **500**, multiple secrets may be selected for testing.

In box **503**, a data stream is generated to be used in a challenge-response communication between processor(s) and memory **112** within security station **101**, and token **210** within battery **109**. As described previously, this data stream can include the combination of a random number, a time stamp, and key **111** that is unique to security station **101**. Thus, each time token **210** receives a challenge, it will be different. With this scheme, even two different security stations that coincidentally used the same random number at exactly the same time would generate different challenges. The data stream may be processed using a one-way function, such as a hash function, prior to being communicated outside security station **101**, in order to prevent reverse-engineering of key **111**.

Token **210** returns a response, which includes an ID code, and method **500** continues with box **504**. Security station **101** sets up a secure authenticated communication session with one or more of remote secret stores **104-106** through computer network **107**. Secure authenticated internet sessions are well-known in the art, as well as secure authenticated sessions for private computer networks. The authenticated session permits security station **101** to have a degree of confidence that it is actually communicating with the selected one of remote secret stores **104-106**, rather than a spoofed site that is posing as a remote secret store. In box **505**, the ID code and response from token **210** are forwarded by security station **101** to the remote secret store, which selects the  $S_n'$  corresponding to battery **109**, using the ID code as an index in a database of secrets for multiple subsystems, processes the data stream using  $S_n'$ . This result is then returned to security station **101**.

Variations can exist in method **500**, specifically regarding boxes **503** and **505**. For example, as described earlier, security station **101** can obtain the ID code from token **210** first, perform the steps of boxes **504** and **505**, and then perform the remaining steps of box **503** using the response from the selected remote secret store. Further, security station can poll multiple secrets within token **210**, with the expectation that one and only one should match. This variation prevents an attacker from identifying which secret is being used for authentication. There is a possibility that an attacker can pass multiple specially-configured versions of notebook computer **102** through a security checkpoint, in an attempt to ascertain whether security station **101** uses one secret index number  $N$  more often than others. If security station **101** polls every one of the secrets every time there is a connection, then such information will be hidden from an attacker. It should be understood though, that multiple secrets could be used for additional confidence in the procedure, such that authenticity and integrity are reported if all secrets pass the challenge/response procedure, but a tampering alarm or alert is generated if one of the secrets fails.

In box **506**, the responses are compared within security station **101**, and a decision is made responsive to the comparison, in box **507**. If  $S_n$  and  $S_n'$  are not properly corresponding secrets in a secret pair, then an alarm will be generated in box **508**. However, if they do correspond, security station **101** will report that the screening has passed in box **509**.

FIG. **6** illustrates another method **600** of performing authenticity and integrity verification. The primary difference between methods **500** and **600** is in where the pass/fail determination is made. In method **500**, the determination is made by security station **500**, whereas in method **600**, the determination is made remotely, for example at one of remote secret stores **104-106**. Starting the description of the difference at box **605**, the response and ID from token **210** are sent to a remote secret store, which uses its local copy of  $S_n'$  to make the pass/fail decision. This is communicated back to security station **101**, in box **606**, and security station then makes its local pass/fail decision in box **607**.

Using the systems and methods disclosed, an embodiment of computer implemented method for determining authenticity and integrity of a subsystem of a notebook computer, may be performed. Embodiments of the method may be performed using a computer program that is executable by a processor and embodied on a computer readable medium. An embodiment of the method comprises: communicating, from a security station, with a security token within a replaceable subsystem of the notebook computer to perform a challenge/response operation with the security token using a first secret stored in the security token, without powering on the note-

book computer, thereby receiving a first response, formed using the first secret, from the security token. An example of a challenge/response operation is sending data for encryption or decryption, in which the secret provides key material for the encryption or decryption operation. The embodiment further comprises: communicating, from the security station, with a remote secret store in an authenticated communication session over a public computer network to perform a challenge/response operation with the remote secret store using a second secret stored in the remote secret store, thereby receiving a second response, formed using the second secret, from the remote secret store. The embodiment further comprises comparing the first response with the second secret for correspondence; and responsive to the comparison, generating a failure alarm if the comparison indicates no correspondence between the first secret and the second secret, and generating a pass indication if the comparison indicates correspondence between the first secret and the second secret.

Correspondence can be indicated by both the first and second responses having at least one portion that is equivalent, or by the first response comprising an encrypted version of a first challenge, the second challenge being at least a portion of the first response, and the second response having a portion that is equivalent to at least a portion of the first challenge. The embodiment may further comprise communicating, from the security station, with the security token to perform a challenge/response operation with the security token using a third secret stored in the security token, without powering on the notebook computer; and comparing the responses from the security token using the third secret and the remote secret store using the second secret, wherein the pass indication is generated even if the comparison indicates no correspondence between the third secret and the second secret. This can be a practical result, even for a failed comparison, when the method compares multiple secrets within one of the security token and the remote secret store with one or more secrets within the other one of the security token and the remote secret store. The security station has no need to permanently store any of the secrets locally, and in some embodiments, the security station may never possess any of the secrets, but merely the resulting responses.

Although the invention and its advantages have been described herein, it should be understood that various changes, substitutions and alterations can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the claims. Moreover, the scope of the application is not intended to be limited to the particular embodiments described in the specification. As one of ordinary skill in the art will readily appreciate from the disclosure, alternatives presently existing or developed later, which perform substantially the same function or achieve substantially the same result as the corresponding embodiments described herein, may be utilized. Accordingly, the appended claims are intended to include within their scope such alternatives and equivalents.

We claim:

1. A battery operated electronic computing apparatus, the apparatus comprising:
  - a housing having a battery compartment;
  - a processor and memory within the housing;
  - a first connector coupled to the processor and memory and located to enable coupling with a battery installed in the battery compartment;
  - an authenticity verification system accessible by the processor, the authenticity verification system comprising anti-counterfeit challenge (ACC) logic and counterfeit

11

detection response (CDR) logic, wherein the authentic-  
 ity verification system is operable to detect a counterfeit  
 battery;

a battery; and

a security token within the battery and accessible by an 5  
 external security station that is outside of the housing  
 and separate from the electronic computing apparatus,  
 wherein the security token is configured to enable an  
 external security station to detect tampering of the bat- 10  
 tery without powering on the electronic computing  
 apparatus.

2. The apparatus of claim 1 further comprising:  
 a second connector on the housing and coupled to the first  
 connector, wherein the security token is coupled to the 15  
 first connector, and wherein the security token is acces-  
 sible to an external security station through the first and  
 second connectors.

3. The apparatus of claim 1 further comprising:  
 a third connector on the battery, wherein the security token 20  
 is coupled to the third connector, and wherein the secu-  
 rity token is accessible to an external security station  
 through the third connector separately than through the  
 first connector.

4. A battery operated electronic computing apparatus, the 25  
 apparatus comprising:  
 a housing having a battery compartment;

12

a processor and memory within the housing;

a first connector coupled to the processor and memory and  
 located to enable coupling with a battery installed in the  
 battery compartment;

a battery; and

a security token within the battery and accessible by an  
 external security station that is outside of the housing  
 and separate from the electronic computing apparatus,  
 wherein the security token is configured to enable an  
 external security station to detect tampering of the bat-  
 tery without powering on the electronic computing  
 apparatus.

5. The apparatus of claim 4 further comprising:  
 a second connector on the housing and coupled to the first  
 connector, wherein the security token is coupled to the 15  
 first connector, and wherein the security token is acces-  
 sible to an external security station through the first and  
 second connectors.

6. The apparatus of claim 4 further comprising:  
 a third connector on the battery, wherein the security token 20  
 is coupled to the third connector, and wherein the secu-  
 rity token is accessible to an external security station  
 through the third connector separately than through the  
 first connector.

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